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The Shoe Doesn’t Fit: General Jurisdiction 
Should Follow Corporate Structure 
Seungwon Chung* 
Imagine a mining corporation—its corporate headquarters 
manages the day-to-day mining operations and focuses on the 
overall strategic direction of the corporation. It is both incorpo-
rated and maintains its headquarters in Michigan. After Daim-
ler AG v. Bauman, a plaintiff looking to sue the corporation on 
an unrelated claim must bring a suit in Michigan.1 
Now imagine that business is booming and the company 
seeks to diversify its assets and product lines.2 It does what 
roughly eighty percent of Fortune 500 companies have already 
done3—it delegates the management of the day-to-day opera-
tion to divisional managers.4 The corporation establishes a divi-
sional office in Virginia, where a bulk of its mining activities 
take place. Although the Virginia office adopts part of the func-
tions of a traditional corporate headquarters, a court would 
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view, in particular Eleanor Wood, Barbara Marchevsky, Evan Livermore, Kyle 
Kroll, and Chris Bowler for their helpful feedback and improving my Article 
with their edits in a way that I never could. Finally, and most importantly, 
thank you to my family for their love and support. Copyright © 2016 by 
Seungwon Chung. 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). 
 2. For further discussion on how the expansion of a corporation’s busi-
ness affects its structure, see Neil Fligstein, The Spread of the Multidivisional 
Form Among Large Firms, 1919–1979, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 377 (1985). 
 3. DUNCAN ANGWIN ET AL., THE STRATEGY PATHFINDER: CORE CON-
CEPTS AND LIVE CASES 108 (2011) (“By the late 1960s over 80% of the Fortune 
500 companies were structured in [the multidivisional form] . . . . Now the M-
form company is the most prevalent structure among large businesses.”). 
 4. See ROBERT E. HOSKISSON & MICHAEL A. HITT, DOWNSCOPING: HOW 
TO TAME THE DIVERSIFIED FIRM 7–8 (1994). 
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likely find that Virginia could not assert general jurisdiction 
over the corporation.5 
This demonstrates that the current general jurisdiction 
doctrine is ill-formulated to confront the nuances of corporate 
organizational structure. The current doctrine only accounts for 
a centralized corporate structure.6 This narrow doctrine exists, 
in part, because the Court adopted the Hertz test for the princi-
pal place of business as part of its general jurisdiction rule, 
and, with it, the inherent limitations of that test.7 The principal 
place of business is a single location8 and, thus, if a corporation 
divides the functions of its corporate headquarters between of-
fices in multiple states, courts must choose between multiple 
locations.9 That result is an imperfect answer because the gen-
eral jurisdiction doctrine does not provide an explanation for 
why a court must make this forced choice. 
The trend toward decentralized corporate functions raises 
the stakes of this mismatch between doctrine and corporate 
practice. The multidivisional form (M-form) is the “most preva-
lent structure” in corporate organization.10 This structure sepa-
rates its corporate headquarters from the management of its 
day-to-day operations, sometimes placing each in a different 
state.11 Thus, when courts confront jurisdictional questions in-
volving these corporations, they “shoehorn a corporation into 
an inappropriate description simply to apply a test.”12 They 
simply do not consider that the corporation might be structured 
differently than a traditional centralized headquarters.13 How-
ever, the courts are not the only ones that make this mistake. 
 
 5. See, e.g., Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221, 
225–26 (2d Cir. 2014) (identifying the principal place of business as a single 
location); Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (lim-
iting the fora of general jurisdiction to the place of incorporation and principal 
place of business). 
 6. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (pointing 
out that the majority does not account for when “a corporation ‘divide[s] [its] 
command and coordinating functions among officers who work at several dif-
ferent locations’” (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95–96 (2010))). 
 7. See id. at 760 (majority opinion). 
 8. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93. 
 9. Id. at 95–96. 
 10. ANGWIN ET AL., supra note 3. 
 11. See, e.g., Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 
F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 12. See Rautenstrauch v. Stern/Leach Co., No. Civ.A 03-10723-DPW, 2004 
WL 42573, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2004) (“[C]ourts must be careful to consider 
the fit of model to reality . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 
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While scholarship has focused on the theoretical basis of 
general jurisdiction, it does not consider how corporations 
structure their organizations.14 This Note fills that gap. In the 
business world, a well-known organizational concept is that 
“structure follows strategy.”15 If corporations change their 
structure in response to changes in their environment,16 courts 
should behave in a similar manner and adjust their general ju-
risdiction doctrine. This Note proposes that the general juris-
diction doctrine should follow corporate structure. In particu-
lar, courts should exercise general jurisdiction in fora where a 
corporation maintains its corporate functions, such as man-
agement of the day-to-day business and direction of overall cor-
porate goals. 
Part I examines the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine, 
and discusses the theories that justify a state’s exercise of such 
jurisdiction. Next, it describes the principal place of business 
test from Hertz Corp. v. Friend17 which serves as a “paradigm 
forum” of general jurisdiction.18 Part II analyzes various corpo-
rate organizational structures that the general jurisdiction doc-
trine does not address. In particular, it highlights that the reli-
ance on the definition of a principal place of business from 
Hertz infringes on state sovereignty. Part III introduces a defi-
 
2014); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 14. See, e.g., Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two 
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865 (2013); Patrick J. 
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119; 
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court 
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77; Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at 
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988); Allan Erbsen, Impersonal 
Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1 (2010); Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State 
Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81 (2013); 
Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business 
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012); Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Con-
cerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J. 1161 (2015); Philip B. 
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Ju-
risdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Allan R. Stein, Styles 
of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 637 (1988). 
 15. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN 
THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 14 (1962) (“The thesis deduced 
from these several propositions is then that structure follows strategy . . . .”). 
 16. See Julie Wulf, The Flattened Firm—Not as Advertised 3 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-087, 2012), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/  
Publication%20Files/12-087_bc50bde2-3016-457a-9bee-dc988cb1056b.pdf. 
 17. 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
 18. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). 
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nition of corporate function that would account for the variety 
of ways corporations organize their business. This Note ulti-
mately proposes that activities that fall within this definition 
should confer general jurisdiction over a corporation and 
demonstrates that the activities have a strong theoretical and 
practical basis. 
I.  A TALE OF TWO EVOLUTIONS IN CORPORATE 
GENERAL JURISDICTION: DOCTRINE AND 
ORGANIZATION   
The development of the corporate general jurisdiction doc-
trine is a two-part story: (1) the evolution of the personal juris-
diction rule governing corporations, which will be explained in 
Section A; and (2) the progression of corporate organizational 
theory, which will be explained in Section B below. These two 
arcs take seemingly opposite paths. On one hand, general cor-
porate jurisdiction evolved from a broad and encompassing doc-
trine to a significantly narrower version. On the other hand, 
corporate structure theory transitioned from a narrow theory of 
centralization to a sprawling and more decentralized scheme. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GENERAL JURISDICTION 
If a corporation maintains certain minimum contact with 
the forum state, a court may exercise general jurisdiction.19 The 
basis of this authority is a state’s sovereignty.20 There are, how-
ever, limits on the state’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction over 
a corporation: fairness considerations under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federalist struc-
ture.21 This Section begins by describing the inception of the 
fairness standard in International Shoe. Then, it proceeds by 
explaining the federalism limitation on personal jurisdiction. 
Finally, this Section concludes by discussing how these broad 
standards evolved into a more limited test in Goodyear and 
Daimler. 
 
 19. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) 
(plurality opinion) (“[W]hether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on 
whether the sovereign has authority to render it.”). 
 20. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 
(1980) (“[T]he Framers also intended that the States retain many essential 
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try 
causes in their courts.”); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 18, at 19 (1834) (“[T]he laws of every state affect, and bind . . . 
all persons, who are resident within it . . . .”). 
 21. See Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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1. International Shoe: Playing Fair with General Jurisdiction 
The modern era of personal jurisdiction emerged with the 
canonical decision International Shoe Co. v. Washington.22 The 
Supreme Court distinguished the types of contacts necessary to 
hold a corporation “amenable to suits unrelated to that activi-
ty,”23 or general jurisdiction, from contacts that “give rise to the 
liabilities sued on,”24 or specific jurisdiction. While “continuous 
and systematic” activity might justify a suit arising from that 
activity, only “continuous corporate operations” justifies gen-
eral jurisdiction.25 The difference between general and specific 
jurisdiction centers on the focus of the contacts analysis. For 
specific jurisdiction, the relationship between the dispute and 
the forum state drives a court’s analysis.26 The court may only 
decide issues that are related to the controversy before it.27 In 
contrast, general jurisdiction is “dispute blind” and concerns 
the relationship between the defendant and the forum state.28 
This all-purpose power allows courts to hear a dispute against 
the defendant regardless of the content or where the conflict 
originated.29 Due to the expansive reach of this jurisdiction, 
courts view the threshold level of minimum contacts as “signifi-
cantly higher” in general jurisdiction cases than in specific ju-
risdiction cases.30 
The primary regulator of this threshold is fairness. The 
Due Process Clause “requires only that in order to subject a de-
 
 22. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 23. Id. at 318. 
 24. Id. at 317. 
 25. Cf. id. at 318 (distinguishing “continuous activity of some sorts” which 
does not confer general jurisdiction and “continuous corporate operations” 
which does (emphasis added)). 
 26. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction To Ad-
judicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) 
(“[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy normally 
support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or 
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate.”). 
 27. For a discussion of the meaning of “related” in the minimum contacts 
analysis, see Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the 
Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 867 (2012). 
 28. See Twitchell, supra note 14, at 627 (“General jurisdiction was dis-
pute-blind—based on the relationship of either the plaintiff or the defendant 
to the forum—whereas specific jurisdiction was dispute-specific.”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 
773, 787 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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fendant to a judgment . . . [that] he have certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”31 
Courts assess fairness to corporations in several ways. First, 
they consider whether there is a burden of litigating in a dis-
tant forum.32 An extraordinary burden might be an indication 
of a violation of Due Process.33 An example of such burdens is 
the inconvenience of travel for the defendant.34 Modern trans-
portation, however, and, in particular, discount airfare, makes 
travel within the United States much easier today than in pre-
vious years.35 Additionally, the ease at which corporations can 
find in-state counsel in a foreign state is facilitated by the 
Internet.36 As a result, the burdens of distant litigation are not 
as prevalent of a concern today as they might have been in the 
past. 
Second, courts also consider the predictability of the forum 
for the defendant. Does the defendant have a reason to believe 
that its activities in the forum will subject it to the authority of 
the state’s courts? A tenet of jurisdiction is that corporations 
should have an opportunity to structure their activities to avoid 
the sovereign power of the forum state.37 Additionally, the pre-
dictability of a forum allows a corporation to “alleviate the risk 
of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance.”38 A corpora-
 
 31. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 
Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 32. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 
(1980). 
 33. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115–16 
(1987) (finding general jurisdiction unreasonable because of the burden placed 
on the defendant). 
 34. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317 (“An ‘estimate of the inconvenienc-
es’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or 
principle place of business is relevant . . . .” (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & 
Gilbert 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930))). 
 35. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (“[M]odern 
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a 
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activi-
ty.”). 
 36. See Erbsen, supra note 14, at 24–25 (describing resources available for 
finding out-of-state counsel); id. at 24 n.88. 
 37. See Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“The Due Process Clause . . . allows 
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit.”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) 
(same). 
 38. Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. For a further discussion on insurance 
and its relationship to litigation burdens, see Erbsen, supra note 14, at 22 
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tion, however, might only believe that it can reasonably be sued 
in the forum state because of its prior experience in court, not 
through some independent subjective belief.39 
In assessing the predictability of the forum, courts also 
look to see if the corporation has “purposely avail[ed] itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities with the forum State.”40 If 
a corporation has “invoke[ed] the benefits and protections of the 
forum’s law,” a suit against a corporation might be justified.41 
This is because a state can extract special responsibilities from 
its citizens even when they are absent from the state.42 For ex-
ample, a state can tax its citizens for income that they obtain 
from out-of-state activities. In essence, a state offers its protec-
tion and police powers in return for the authority to subject a 
corporation to its adjudicatory power. Reciprocal benefits and 
burdens offer a strong basis for the state’s exercise of adjudica-
tory authority.43 
Over time, the International Shoe jurisdiction evolved and, 
despite this high bar for exercising general jurisdiction, courts 
began to treat general jurisdiction as “an imperfect safety valve 
that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in 
cases when specific jurisdiction would deny it.”44 They support-
ed this broad scope of general jurisdiction by searching for the 
“approximate physical presence” of the corporation.45 A corpora-
 
n.79. 
 39. See Oral Argument at 4:18, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014) (No. 11-965), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/11-965 (describing Mer-
cedes-Benz USA’s assumption that there was general jurisdiction over it). 
 40. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(indicating that “both theories of personal jurisdiction” require purposeful 
availment). 
 41. Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 42. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (“[T]he authority of a 
state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence 
from the state. The state which accords him privileges and affords protection 
to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal du-
ties.”). 
 43. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 733 (“On balance, the reciprocal 
benefits and burdens rationale provides the most satisfactory basis for the 
state’s exercise of coercive power.”). Contra Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of 
“Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 537 (2012) 
(“[A]ssessing an appropriate level of reciprocal benefits to justify general ju-
risdiction seems particularly arbitrary.”). 
 44. Borchers, supra note 14, at 139; see also Twitchell, supra note 14, at 
632–33 (suggesting that courts use general jurisdiction when specific jurisdic-
tion is proper). 
 45. See, e.g., King v. Am. Family Mutual Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir. 
2011); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., 647 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011); 
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tion, however, can only manifest its “presence” by “activities 
carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for 
it.”46 Accordingly, courts determined if a corporation was “pre-
sent” by assessing its attributes such as: (1) an office or em-
ployees; (2) sales in the state; (3) solicitations of business in the 
state; (4) bank accounts; (5) the appointment of an agent for 
service of process; and (6) registration to do business in the 
state.47 This expansive view of general jurisdiction, which dom-
inated the courts for decades, would soon begin to be slowly 
clawed back. 
2. Volkswagen: Our Federalist Limitation on General  
Jurisdiction 
Several decades after International Shoe, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the limitation on the grasp of state sover-
eignty arising from the federalist structure.48 Under the Consti-
tution, the fifty states are coequals in dignity and authority.49 
The ability of a particular state to adjudicate a controversy im-
plicates the interest of other states.50 For example, if a plaintiff 
brings a suit in one state, other states might be precluded from 
hearing the case.51 Therefore, a state’s inappropriate assertion 
 
Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (“[General jurisdiction] contacts must be so extensive to be tanta-
mount to SSBO France being constructively present in the state . . . .”); Ban-
croft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 
2000); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (“Here 
the activities of the defendant corporations in South Carolina, although possi-
bly sufficient to constitute ‘presence’ are nonetheless minimal.”). 
 46. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This common 
misunderstanding about corporate “presence” has led some plaintiffs to con-
flate a corporation’s “presence” with the presence of a high-level officer in the 
state. See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 47. See, e.g., Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Group) Co., 701 F.3d 598, 620 
(10th Cir. 2012); Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 
F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2012); King, 632 F.3d at 579; Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 
F.3d at 1225; Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 
646 F.3d 589, 597–98 (8th Cir. 2011); Negron-Torres v. Verizon Commc’ns, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 48. For further discussion of the limitations of state power set by federal-
ism, see Erbsen, supra note 14. 
 49. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 
(1980) (“[Minimum contacts] act[] to ensure that the States, through their 
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as 
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”). 
 50. See Erbsen, supra note 14, at 63. 
 51. See id. at 63 n.254 (describing the implications of modern preclusion 
law). 
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of jurisdiction “upset[s] the federal balance, which posits that 
each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful in-
trusion by other States.”52 
With these state sovereignty considerations in mind, per-
sonal jurisdiction cases present an allocation problem.53 The re-
lationship between the defendant and the forum state deter-
mines whether the allocation of personal jurisdiction in one 
state undermines the interest of other states. Consider, for ex-
ample, the citizenship of the defendant. A state has a strong in-
terest in regulating the activities of its citizens.54 As a result, a 
state raises a federalism concern when it subjects a citizen of 
another state to the power of its tribunals.55 This does not mean 
that all efforts by a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
another state’s citizen offend notions of federalism. States can 
exercise limited jurisdiction over causes of action related to ac-
tivities within the state.56 
3. Goodyear and Daimler: “Home” Is Where General  
Jurisdiction Is 
Though the general jurisdiction doctrine was constrained 
by concerns of fairness and federalism, in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,57 the Supreme Court further 
confined the general jurisdiction doctrine. After Goodyear, a 
court may only exercise general jurisdiction over a corporation 
“when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum 
State.”58 Recently, the Supreme Court solidified its rejection of 
the broad approach discussed above, describing it as “unaccept-
 
 52. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011). 
 53. See Erbsen, supra note 14, at 66 (“To say that a given exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction is unconstitutional is thus to say that a state has usurped 
authority that belongs elsewhere.”). 
 54. See STORY, supra note 20, § 21, at 22 (“[Y]et every nation has a right 
to bind its own subjects by its own laws in every other place.”). 
 55. See Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“[T]here are the federalism concerns of state sovereignty—in which we in-
quire about the power of one state to subject to its process the citizen of anoth-
er state.”). 
 56. Id. at 377 (“The concerns that injuries might occur in the state or 
might somehow implicate Texas component-part manufacturers are adequate-
ly protected. Beech is subject to the specific jurisdiction of Texas courts when 
its product causes injuries . . . in Texas.”). 
 57. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 58. Id. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 
(1945)). 
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ably grasping,”59 and narrowed the scope of the doctrine. In-
stead, the Court made clear that “only a limited set of affilia-
tions” can overcome the high threshold for general jurisdic-
tion.60 In doing so, the Court relied on developments in specific 
jurisdiction to fill the holes left by a narrower rule.61 Under the 
current doctrine, general jurisdiction over corporate defendants 
is proper “when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continu-
ous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in 
the forum State.”62 The place of incorporation and the principal 
place of business are “paradigm” examples of such affiliations.63 
Scholarship has addressed theories of general jurisdiction,64 in 
particular, the meaning of “at home.”65 This Part, however, does 
not recap those explanations. Instead, it explores the justifica-
tions behind the fora associated with being “at home”: the state 
of incorporation and the principal place of business.66  
a. The Basis for the State of Incorporation 
As a “creature[] of state law,” each corporation holds a spe-
cial relationship with its place of incorporation.67 A corporation 
can only possess the properties and powers that its charter con-
 
 59. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014). 
 60. Id. at 760 (“Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations 
with a forum will render a defendant amendable to all-purpose jurisdiction 
there.”). 
 61. See id. at 757–58 (“Specific jurisdiction has been cut loose from 
Pennoyer’s sway . . . . As this Court has increasingly trained on [specific juris-
diction], general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place in the 
contemporary scheme.” (citation omitted)); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. 
Freer, Be Careful What You Wish for: Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration 
of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001, 2003 (2014) (“Specific 
jurisdiction has received the lion’s share of the Court’s attention . . . .”). 
 62. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851). 
 63. Id. at 754 (“With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation 
and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdic-
tion.’” (quoting Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 735)). 
 64. See supra note 14. 
 65. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 14, at 86; Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is 
Home Depot “At Home”?: Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business 
Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 259–62 (2014); James R. Pielemeier, 
Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of General Personal 
Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 987–91 (2012); Stein, supra note 
43, at 528 (“This Article will attempt to . . . construe the ‘essentially at home’ 
standard . . . .”). 
 66. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854. 
 67. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of 
state law . . . .”); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587–88 
(1839) (“[A] corporation is the mere creature of a law of the state . . . .”). 
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fers upon it.68 This dependence upon state law subjects a corpo-
ration to the “most complete and penetrating regulation.”69 The 
state of incorporation is the “only one State [that has] the au-
thority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs.”70 Since a 
corporation incorporates in a single state, a corporation’s rela-
tionship with that state is unique. This relationship provides 
both the corporation and the state with several benefits. 
When deciding where to incorporate, corporations base 
their decision on the benefits that each state provides them.71 
Some states, like Delaware, provide the corporations and 
shareholders “maximum flexibility in ordering their affairs.”72 
Corporate law in these states also differs on issues such as the 
voting rights of stockholders.73 Empirical evidence demon-
strates that these differences drive a corporation’s decision to 
incorporate in that state.74 But the street goes both ways. 
States can create a lucrative industry.75 Income received from 
corporation franchise taxes funds the state budget.76 For exam-
ple, a quarter of Delaware’s budget is generated from the in-
corporation industry.77 As a result, the Delaware legislature 
 
 68. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 
How.) 497, 558 (1844). 
 69. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949). 
 70. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (describing the inter-
nal affairs doctrine). 
 71. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 156 
(11th ed. 2010) (“Selection of the state of incorporation involves an appraisal of 
two factors: (a) a dollars-and-cents analysis . . . and (b) a consideration of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the substantive corporation laws of these 
states.”). 
 72. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 2 
(2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf. 
 73. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.471, subdiv. 1 (2015) (providing ap-
praisal rights in a wide variety of circumstances), with DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 262 (2015) (providing dissenter rights only in mergers). 
 74. See generally Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) (describing how corpo-
rate laws affect migration of corporations). 
 75. See Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how 
-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html (“Delaware’s tax laws are a 
bonanza for the state . . . . Delaware collected roughly $860 million in taxes 
and fees . . . in 2011.”). 
 76. BLACK, supra note 72, at 1. 
 77. Wayne, supra note 75 (“That money accounted for a quarter of the 
state’s total budget.”). 
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maintains the incorporation laws at “state-of-the-art” level.78 In 
this sense, there is a vested interest by the general public of the 
state in the corporations incorporated in the state. This bolsters 
the notion that a corporation might be a political insider, and, 
therefore, properly subjected to jurisdiction.79 
Furthermore, the benefits of a state of incorporation are far 
reaching. In a dispute against a corporation, the law of the 
state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration.80 Even if a corporation operates in a foreign state, the 
laws of its state of incorporation still protect the corporation’s 
decisions.81 Therefore, corporations cannot make decisions 
without extending the power of those decisions nationally.82 
Incorporation provides convenience for the corporation. 
Given that the corporation based its incorporation decision, in 
part, on the state’s laws,83 it is fair to assume that the corpora-
tion is familiar with those laws.84 In combination with this fa-
miliarity, the courts of the state might provide the corporation 
with a considerable advantage. The Delaware courts, for exam-
ple, are considered some of the most experienced and capable 
courts for adjudicating corporate issues.85 In fact, a corporation 
might prefer to be sued in these courts.86 
Familiarity with a state’s courts alone cannot justify all-
purpose jurisdiction.87 For instance, a hostile corporation or in-
 
 78. BLACK, supra note 72, at 1. 
 79. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 742–43. 
 80. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 
1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) (“It is now well established that only the law of the 
state of incorporation governs and determines issues relating to a corpora-
tion’s internal affairs.”). 
 81. See Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate 
Internal Affairs, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 164 (1985) (“The statute thus 
directs that Delaware law be applied to Delaware corporations, a directive 
presumably applicable not only to Delaware courts but to courts of other juris-
dictions as well.”). 
 82. The Full Faith and Credit Clause also regulates the choice of law. U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 83. See supra notes 71 and 74 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 734. 
 85. See BLACK, supra note 72, at 5. 
 86. Id. at 7 (“[A corporation’s general counsel] told me that, if his corpora-
tion is going to be sued anyway, he would far prefer to litigate in the Court of 
Chancery . . . .”). 
 87. See Pl. AstraZeneca AB’s Opposition to Def. Mylan Pharm. Inc.’s Mot. 
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at 10, AstraZeneca, AB v. Mylan 
Pharm. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (2014) (No. 14-00696-GMS), 2014 WL 4745281 
(“Mylan has made itself at home in Delaware district court.”). 
Chung_4FMT  
2016] THE SHOE DOESN’T FIT 1611 
 
dividual can draw a corporation into a protracted battle requir-
ing frequent litigation. Such a scenario is not so farfetched. 
Consider the patent dispute between Samsung and Apple, 
which spanned nineteen lawsuits in twelve courts in nine coun-
tries on four continents.88 A large number of these suits take 
place in California.89 Constant litigation is part of Apple’s busi-
ness strategy,90 and, as a result, Samsung might find itself in 
court again and again.91 If frequent litigation is sufficient to es-
tablish general jurisdiction, Apple’s litigation would effectively 
bring Samsung under California’s adjudicatory authority. The 
Supreme Court rejected this precise process of unilateral juris-
diction “creation.”92 Thus, a corporation must have a stronger 
relationship with a forum state than a mere use of the state’s 
institutions. 
b. The Principal Place of Business 
One such relationship is the principal place of business. 
Traditionally, domicile provides a strong justification for a 
state’s exercise of general jurisdiction.93 Aside from the state of 
incorporation, the principal place of business is the closest in-
carnation of a corporation’s domicile.94 A court may exercise 
general jurisdiction even if a corporation only maintains its 
principal place of business in the state temporarily.95 In identi-
 
 88. Chloe Albanesius, Every Place Samsung and Apple Are Suing Each 
Other, PC MAG. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817, 
2392920,00.asp. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444358404577 
609810658082898 (“Apple’s legal campaign is partly aimed at trying to beat 
back the gangbuster growth of Android . . . .”). 
 91. See Josh Lowensohn, Round Two: Apple and Samsung Suit Up for 
Another Billion Dollar Patent War, VERGE (Mar. 31, 2014) http://www 
.theverge.com/2014/3/31/5564134/round-two-apple-and-samsung-suit-up-for 
-another-billion-dollar-patent. 
 92. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 314 
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basis for the assertion of jurisdiction is 
not the happenstance that an individual over whom petitioner had no control 
made a unilateral decision to take a chattel with him to a distant State.”). 
 93. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 730 (“Domicile is traditionally 
the strongest basis supporting general jurisdiction over a party.”). 
 94. Id. at 733–34. 
 95. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984) 
(“Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business so that 
Ohio jurisdiction was proper even over a cause of action unrelated to the activ-
ities in the State.”). 
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fying the principal places of business as a paradigm forum, the 
Court explicitly referenced Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the seminal 
case defining corporation citizenship.96 To understand the ra-
tionale behind the principal place of business, it is important to 
examine the evolution of the Hertz test and its justifications. 
From the inception of corporations, these entities present-
ed a unique problem for jurisdictional questions because they 
are artificial creatures of law.97 In its early encounters with the 
problem of corporate citizenship, the Supreme Court concluded 
that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation.98 
Concerns, however, about corporation’s ability to “manipulate 
federal-court jurisdiction” led Congress to modify the definition 
of corporate citizenship in the diversity statute.99 As a result, 
Congress amended the diversity statute to include “the princi-
pal place of business.”100 
Prior to Hertz, the federal courts experimented with a vari-
ety of tests for determining the corporation’s “principal place of 
business.” The major difference between these tests is that 
some focus on the center of a corporation’s business activity, 
while others focus on the corporation’s center of its policymak-
ing.101 Courts have applied three tests to determine a corpora-
tion’s principal place of business.102 
First, utilizing the nerve center test, courts look for the 
corporation’s nerve center from which “its officers direct, con-
trol and coordinate all activities without regard to locale, in the 
 
 96. Compare Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (citing 
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010)), with Goodyear Dunlop Tire Op-
erations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) (lacking a reference to 
Hertz). 
 97. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are crea-
tures of state law . . . .”); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587–
88 (1839) (“[A] corporation is the mere creature of a law of the state . . . .”). 
 98. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 
How.) 497, 558 (1844) (“[A] corporation created by and doing business in a par-
ticular state . . . for the purposes of its incorporation, [is] capable of being 
treated as a citizen of that state . . . .”). 
 99. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 86. 
 100. Id. at 88. 
 101. See Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 835–
36 (8th Cir. 2004) (focusing on the location of a corporation’s business activi-
ties); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 787 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The 
principal place of business—under the law of this circuit anyway—is where 
the corporation’s nerve center is.”); Lugo-Vina v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 574 F.2d 
41, 43 (1st Cir. 1978) (focusing on the location of a corporation’s policymaking 
activities). 
 102. See Capitol Indem. Corp., 367 F.3d at 835. 
Chung_4FMT  
2016] THE SHOE DOESN’T FIT 1613 
 
furtherance of the corporate objective.”103 In Scot Typewriter Co. 
v. Underwood Corp., a plaintiff sued a manufacturer of type-
writers in New York.104 The corporation maintained three man-
ufacturing plants, but none in New York.105 The defendant, 
however, supervised and coordinated all of its activities out of 
an office in New York.106 Therefore, the court concluded that the 
New York constituted the defendant’s principal place of busi-
ness.107  
Second, under the corporate activities test, a corporation’s 
principal place of business exists where there is “a substantial 
predominance of corporate activity.”108 In Inland Rubber Corp. 
v. Triple A Tire Service, Inc., the court focused on the corpora-
tion’s “day-to-day control of Inland’s sales operations” in New 
York.109 Additionally, the court noted that officers in New York 
were “in general charge of Inland’s operations in New York and 
Florida.”110 In other words, the corporate activities test looks for 
where the corporation’s day-to-day management takes place.111 
Finally, the locus of the operations test focuses on where 
the majority of the corporation’s actual physical operations 
were located.112 This test is comparative. It considers the loca-
tion of the corporation’s employees, tangible property, produc-
tion activities, sources of income, and where sales take place, 
and then compares the magnitude of those activities in the fo-
rum state with the corporation’s nationwide activities.113 The 
corporation’s principal place of business is located in the state 
with the greatest amount of activity. The Supreme Court found 
 
 103. Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). For a further discussion of the nerve center test, see Lindsey 
D. Saunders, Note, Determining a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business: A 
Uniform Approach to Diversity Jurisdiction, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1475, 1479 
(2006). 
 104. Scot Typewriter Co., 170 F. Supp. at 864. 
 105. Id. (describing the locations of the manufacturing plants in Connecti-
cut, New Jersey and California). 
 106. Id. (“[The corporation’s] executive activities [in New York include] 
over-all supervision and coordination of all functional operations.”). 
 107. Id. at 865.  
 108. Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 109. 220 F. Supp. 490, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
 110. Id. at 492. 
 111. See, e.g., de Walker v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 569 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir. 
1978); Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 112. See, e.g., Inland Rubber Corp., 220 F. Supp. at 492. 
 113. Id. 
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this test “unusually difficult to apply” due to the diversity of 
factors.114 Courts assigned each factor varying importance 
which resulted in unpredictable application of the test.115 
Provided with these standards, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the “nerve center” test superior to the alternatives for 
three reasons.116 First, the text of the diversity statute support-
ed a narrow and singular approach to the principal place of 
business.117 The word “place” is singular, not plural.118 Addi-
tionally, “principal” denotes a location that is first in rank, and, 
therefore, must reside in a single location.119 Second, the test 
promotes administrative simplicity.120 The corporate headquar-
ters is “easily ascertainable” and promotes greater predictabil-
ity.121 Predictability allows corporations to make better business 
and investment decisions.122 Finally, the nerve center test pre-
vents the comparative problem of the gross income test rejected 
by Congress.123 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
Even as the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine trended 
toward the simpler and narrower interpretation, corporate 
structure took the opposite journey—going from a straightfor-
ward era of centralization to the complex and multifaceted the-
ory of diversification and decentralization. This Section de-
scribes the evolution of corporate structure, including a 
detailed look at the rationale behind each transition.  
1. The Centralization of Corporate Authority 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the unitary 
form, or U-form, was the dominant configuration of corpora-
 
 114. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 90 (2010). 
 115. Cf. R. G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655–57 
(2d Cir. 1979) (noting that courts emphasize different factors depending on 
whether the corporate operations span many states or are more centralized). 
 116. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93 (“Three sets of considerations, taken together, 
convince us that this approach, while imperfect, is superior to other possibili-
ties.”). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 94. 
 121. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (explaining that 
clear jurisdictional rules provide greater certainty).  
 122. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94. 
 123. Id. at 95. 
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tions.124 U-form corporations rely on heavily centralized struc-
tures, often organized along functional lines (such as sales, fi-
nances, and manufacturing).125 Power is extremely concentrated 
in a U-form corporation. High-level corporate officers make all 
of the long-term planning and daily operating decisions.126 The-
se officers are concerned with two activities: maintaining the 
long-run health of the company and the smooth and efficient 
day-to-day operation.127 The next layer of management consists 
of the “functional areas of the firm” like “production, market-
ing, personnel and finance.”128 
This corporate structure gained prominence in response to 
the need for a strong centralization in the manufacturing in-
dustry—by integrating and streamlining production and distri-
bution, U-form companies benefited from the economies of 
scale.129 This strategy made lots of sense for single prod-
uct/industry companies like General Motors and DuPont Ex-
plosive Powder Company. The U-form structure provides these 
corporations with several advantages. First, it streamlines 
communication within the corporation along functional lines.130 
The production function of a corporation is handled entirely by 
a production manager rather than being dispersed among 
many officers. The second advantage is that the U-form allows 
for the specialization in a single functional area in each de-
partment.131 As a result, the production department is only re-
quired to understand the details of production and no other 
field.132 The advantages of the U-form, however, diminish as the 
business begins to grow. 
When faced with entry into multiple markets and a re-
quirement for various expertise, the corporate officers tend to 
 
 124. See ANGWIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 107–08. For a discussion of a clas-
sic case study of the U-form, see CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 52–113. 
 125. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 133 (1975). 
 126. See ROBERT F. FREELAND, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE MOD-
ERN CORPORATION 12 (2001); MARIA MOSCHANDREAS, BUSINESS ECONOMICS 
54–55 (2d ed. 2000) (“The CEO is responsible for both long-term (strategic) de-
cisions and the day-to-day running of the functions.”). 
 127. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9. 
 128. MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 54. 
 129. See J. BARKLEY ROSSER, JR. & MARINA V. ROSSER, COMPARATIVE 
ECONOMICS IN A TRANSFORMING WORLD ECONOMY 127–28 (2d ed. 2004). 
 130. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 55. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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be overburdened and overstretched by the U-form structure.133 
This process results in a coordination problem where the high-
level officers must rely on imperfect information to command 
the business of the corporation.134 Eventually for General Mo-
tors and DuPont, these difficulties led to the rise of a decentral-
ized structure known as the multidivisional form.135 
2. The Rise of Multidivisional Corporations 
Faced with the limitations of the U-form structure, compa-
nies like DuPont and General Motors adapted their businesses 
by decentralizing the management and control functions of 
their businesses.136 Today, the multidivisional form is “the pre-
ferred organizational form for the large firms that dominate the 
American economy”137 and, to some, the “most important single 
innovation [for American capitalism] of the twentieth centu-
ry.”138 The M-form decentralized core managing operations into 
departments.139 It separates the strategic decision-making from 
the day-to-day operating decisions handled by the corporate of-
fices in a U-form structure by delegating the latter to divi-
sions.140 
 
 133. See FREELAND, supra note 126; see also CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 
299 (“[T]he problems of coordination, appraisal, and policy formulation [be-
come] too intricate for a small number of top officers to handle both long-run, 
entrepreneurial, and short-run, operational administrative activities.”). 
 134. See Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, Coordinating Tasks in M-Form and 
U-Form Organisations 3 (Suntory Ctr., Discussion Paper No. TE/03/458, 
2003), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3746/1/Coordinating_Tasks_in_M-Form_and_U 
-Form_Organisations.pdf; see also CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 91 (“The es-
sential difficulty was that diversification greatly increased the demands on 
[DuPont’s] administrative offices.”). 
 135. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 104–13 (describing how the strategy 
of diversification led to the formation of a “decentralized,” multidivisional cor-
porate form). 
 136. Id. at 52–162 (describing the evolution of the multidivisional structure 
in DuPont and General Motors). 
 137. Fligstein, supra note 2, at 388.  
 138. Joseph T. Mahoney, The Adoption of the Multidivisional Form of Or-
ganization: A Contingency Model, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 49, 49 (1992) (quoting 
Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion, Organization Form, and the 
Multi-division Hypothesis, in THE CORPORATE ECONOMY 382 (Robin Marris & 
Adrian Wood eds., 1971)). 
 139. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Functions of the HQ Unit in the 
Multibusiness Firm, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 31, 33 (1991) (“The M-form came 
into being when senior managers operating through existing centralized, func-
tionally departmentalized U-Form structures realized that they had neither 
the time nor the necessary information to coordinate and monitor day-to-day 
operations . . . .”). 
 140. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56. 
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M-form corporations have three levels of autonomous 
planning and administrative offices: the corporate headquar-
ters, the division, and the business unit.141 The role of the cor-
poration headquarters in an M-form corporation is the 
“coordinat[ion], apprais[al], and plan[ning of] goals and poli-
cies” and the “allocat[ion of] resources.”142 Therefore, the gen-
eral office maintains strategic decision-making and control of 
the operating divisions.143 
The corporate office’s control is not absolute. The divisional 
offices function as “semi-autonomous” entities responsible for 
its own set of operating decisions.144 In fact, the corporate office 
is not involved with “routine functional activities within these 
units.”145 Each division is responsible for coordinating and 
managing the corporation’s business within its designation.146 
This function is handled by the division’s headquarters.147 Fi-
nally, these divisions can be based on a geographical area148 or 
be product related.149  
The M-form structure provides three major advantages. 
First, it shifts the burden of day-to-day management from the 
general office to the divisional units.150 This process allows the 
 
 141. See Chandler, supra note 139, at 34. 
 142. CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9. 
 143. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56 (“The general office is as-
signed responsibilities of strategic decision making and control of operating 
divisions.”). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Mahoney, supra note 138, at 50. Contra Laura Poppo, The Visible 
Hands of Hierarchy Within the M-Form: An Empirical Test of Corporate Par-
enting of Internal Product Exchanges, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 403, 405 (2003) 
(“[W]e develop a theory of selective corporate involvement, which describes 
when corporate staff is most likely to involve itself in divisional matters . . . .”). 
 146. Chandler, supra note 139 (“The divisional offices coordinated produc-
tion and distribution (and often product development) using the U-form struc-
ture.”). 
 147. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9–10 (“The departmental headquar-
ters in its turn coordinates, appraises, and plans for a number of field units.”). 
 148. See GRANT FLEMING ET AL., THE BIG END OF TOWN: BIG BUSINESS 
AND CORPORATE LEADERSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AUSTRALIA 163 (2004) 
(“Divisions may be organised by product, customers, geography or related 
business units (or a combination of these).”). 
 149. See Company Structure, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/ 
about-jnj/company-structure (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (describing Johnson & 
Johnson’s company structure as a division between consumer healthcare, med-
ical devices, and pharmaceuticals). 
 150. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56. For an example of why 
this burden-shifting is necessary, see Jay R. Galbraith, The Evolution of En-
terprise Organization Designs, 1 J. ORG. DESIGN, no. 2, 2012, at 1, 4 (describ-
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general office to focus on the strategic decisions that might 
make the corporation successful in the long run.151 Second, the 
expertise and closer contact of the divisional managers with the 
day-to-day business promotes speed and efficiency.152 
Finally, the M-form provides the corporation with growth 
potential and economic benefits. Although the extent of those 
benefits are debatable,153 corporations view the shift to a multi-
divisional structure as “the best way for them to manage con-
tinuous growth and complexity.”154 In fact, the multidivisional 
form is considered “American capitalism’s most important sin-
gle innovation of the twentieth century.”155 Studies confirm that 
the M-form provides corporations with innovative power and 
flexibility.156 
3. The Final Evolution: Multisubsidiary Corporations 
As Daimler demonstrates, corporations can also take the 
multisubsidiary form, dividing its products and operations be-
tween multiple different subsidiaries.157 Changes in corporate 
 
ing the burdens of the cell-division model on the corporate headquarters); see 
also FREELAND, supra note 126 (“[Divisionalization] reduce[s] overload at the 
top by clarifying lines of authority and communication.”). 
 151. See Mahoney, supra note 138, at 50 (“The M-form is viewed from the 
efficiency perspective as in institutional response to problems of interdepend-
ence . . . .”); see also Poppo, supra note 145, at 404 (“[C]orporate staff cannot be 
overburdened with the specific information relevant to operating divisions and 
should instead focus on long-term strategic decisions that maximize the overall 
profit of the firm.”). 
 152. See MOSCHANDREAS, supra note 126, at 56; see also Donald A. Palmer 
et al., Late Adoption of the Multidivisional Form by Large U.S. Corporations: 
Institutional, Political, and Economic Accounts, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 100, 102–03 
(1993) (describing the economic rationale behind the M-form structure). 
 153. See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 119; Charles W. L. Hill, Inter-
nal Organization and Enterprise Performance: Some UK Evidence, 6 MANAGE-
RIAL & DECISION ECON. 210, 214 (1985) (“The results significantly demon-
strate the superior profitability of M-form firms.”). Contra Robert F. Freeland, 
The Myth of the M-Form? Governance, Consent, and Organizational Change, 
102 AM. J. SOC. 483, 518 (1996) (“[The] mythical M-form offers a prescription 
for economic decline.”). 
 154. ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 324:25, 
Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2016). 
 155. Williamson, supra note 138. 
 156. See generally Robert E. Hoskisson et al., The Multidivisional Struc-
ture: Organizational Fossil or Source of Value?, 19 J. MGMT. 269 (1993) (evalu-
ating the economic benefits of the M-form structure); Yingyi Qian et al., Coor-
dinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations (Working Paper No. 
284, 1999), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.116 
.7838&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 157. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014). 
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tax laws facilitated the transformation of multidivisional corpo-
rations to multisubsidiary (MSF) corporations.158 The M-form 
usually consists of a parent firm that is organized as divisions 
based on product lines.159 In contrast, the MSF is defined as 
“involving two or more levels of subsidiaries with a parent 
company at the top.”160 
In order to understand the difference between the M-form 
and MSF, it is important to first understand the difference be-
tween a division and a subsidiary. A division is generally char-
acterized as: 
[Being] 100 percent owned by the parent firm and distinguished as 
holding its assets as operating units . . . under central office con-
trol . . . . [I]t does not have its own central office, nor does it have its 
own board and officers. Most importantly, it does not issue or hold 
stock.161 
In contrast, a subsidiary is a “separate legal entity . . . . 
[and is] financially controlled to the extent that its ownership 
by the parent company is equal to or exceeds 51 percent.”162 As 
a result, the subsidiary is decoupled from the parent company 
which protects the corporation’s assets.163 The subsidiary has 
its own board and its own corporate office.164  
Therefore, the critical characteristic that differentiates the 
M-form from the multisubsidiary form is control over the oper-
ating units. In an M-form corporation, the corporation main-
tains the authority to manage the day-to-day operations of the 
corporation. Instead of exercising that power, the corporation 
delegates that management to the divisional office. On the oth-
er hand, the subsidiary in a multisubsidiary corporation con-
 
 158. See John Boies & Harland Prechel, Capital Dependence, Business Po-
litical Behavior, and Change to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form, 49 SOC. 
PROBS. 301, 308 (2002) (“[Capitalists and managers] redefined corporations’ 
institutional arrangements by changing corporate tax laws in a way that facil-
itated the transformation of divisions into subsidiaries . . . .”). 
 159. See Mary Zey & Tami Swenson, The Transformation and Survival of 
Fortune 500 Industrial Corporations Through Mergers and Acquisitions, 1981–
1995, 42 SOC. Q. 461, 464–65 (2001) [hereinafter Survival of Fortune 500 In-
dustrial Corporations]. 
 160. Mary Zey & Tami Swenson, The Transformation of the Dominant Cor-
porate Form from Multidivisional to Multisubsidiary: The Role of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act, 40 SOC. Q. 241, 243 (1999). 
 161. Id. at 244. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Survival of Fortune 500 Industrial Corporations, supra note 159, 
at 465. 
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trols its own day-to-day operations.165 Although the subsidiary 
may be a separate legal entity, it is also financially dependent 
on its parent company.166 
Berkshire Hathaway illustrates the complexity of the con-
trol issue. As a conglomerate, it fully owns its subsidiaries.167 
The basic function of the corporate headquarters in a conglom-
erate is a budgetary one.168 In Berkshire Hathaway, for exam-
ple, Warren Buffett makes “[i]nvestment decisions and all other 
capital allocation decisions” while operating decisions are left to 
the various Berkshire businesses.169 The subsidiary’s corporate 
functions are technically independent from its parent company 
while, at the same time, the subsidiary is financially dependent 
on the parent company. 
Given this complexity, whether a conglomerate can avail 
itself to general jurisdiction through the actions of its subsidi-
aries is a question of agency not personal jurisdiction.170 Such a 
discussion is outside of the parameters of this Note. Instead, 
the key question is whether any corporate activity of the parent 
company is delegated to the subsidiaries. As with every juris-
dictional assessment, the answer to this question is fact de-
pendent. Generally, the conglomerate’s day-to-day operations is 
the purchase of and investment in its subsidiaries. On the oth-
er hand, the conglomerate functions similarly to an M-form 
structure, with various products and regional divisions.171 If, 
however, the subsidiary exercises control over the parent com-
pany’s day-to-day business, the conglomerate would present a 
similar challenge that the multidivisional structure presents.172 
 
 165. Asli M. Colpan & Takashi Hikino, Foundations of Business Groups: 
Towards an Integrated Framework, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS 
GROUPS 15, 29 (Asli Colpan et al. eds., 2010), https://books.google.com/ 
books?id=RL2pWCa9Z24C&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
 166. See JONATHAN W. FOWLER & KURT A. STRASSER, BLUMBERG ON COR-
PORATE GROUPS § 59.04[A] (2014) (“[When] the subsidiary has not accom-
plished its own financing but is funded by the parent or the group, the subsid-
iary is dependent on its parent for advances either for working capital or for 
continuing in business . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 167. Colpan & Hikino, supra note 165, at 29. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. For a discussion on whether a wholly owned subsidiary can be at-
tributed to the parent, see Burt Neuborne, General Jurisdiction, “Corporate 
Separateness,” and the Rule of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 95 (2013). 
 171. See PETER G. KLEIN, THE CAPITALIST & THE ENTREPRENEUR 42 (2010) 
(“[T]he conglomerate could emerge only after the multidivisional structure had 
been diffused widely throughout the corporate sector.”). 
 172. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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II.  THE CURRENT GENERAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR CORPORATE STRUCTURE   
The corporate general jurisdiction doctrine does not ac-
count for the reality of corporate structure. Courts assume that 
corporations are monolithic creatures. The history of corporate 
organization shows, however, that corporations come in all 
shapes and sizes. Since the early 1900s, large corporations have 
transitioned away from a centralized headquarter towards a 
decentralized approach by delegating management authority to 
divisional offices.173 This development presents a jurisdictional 
problem. Part A analyzes how the courts assess the principal 
place of business in the personal jurisdiction context. These 
courts assume that a corporation’s principal place of business is 
the same as it is in the diversity context. Part A concludes that 
this assumption is improper. For personal jurisdiction cases, 
courts should not blindly adopt the Hertz test, which is meant 
to determine citizenship for diversity jurisdiction, because that 
approach imposes the diversity statute’s limitations on person-
al jurisdiction. As Part B explains, the corporate general juris-
diction, which emphasizes the principal place of business, falls 
short when accounting for corporate structures other than the 
centralized U-form. Thus, this Part concludes that corporate 
organizational structure makes a limited definition of a princi-
pal place of business unworkable.  
A. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS 
Despite the Hertz test’s wide adoption by courts, it faces 
limitations. In fact, the Supreme Court agrees.174 This Section 
analyzes how courts have adopted the principal place of busi-
ness test in personal jurisdiction cases. After concluding that 
courts use the test no differently in diversity cases, this Section 
assesses the differences between the diversity cases and per-
sonal jurisdiction. It concludes that the principal place of busi-
ness faces different constraints in the personal jurisdiction con-
text than in the diversity context. 
 
 173. See WILSON B. BROWN, MARKETS, ORGANIZATIONS AND INFORMATION: 
BEYOND THE DICHOTOMIES OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 75–77 (1992) (de-
scribing the origins of the unitary form). 
 174. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010) (describing the Hertz test 
as an “imperfect” approach). 
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1. The Principal Place of Business in the General Jurisdiction  
Context 
The current general jurisdiction rule requires courts to de-
termine the corporation’s principal place of business.175 Some 
courts explicitly adopted the Hertz test in order to locate a cor-
poration’s principal place of business.176 Although other courts 
did not adopt the Hertz test, those courts identified the princi-
pal place of business as the corporate headquarters.177 Courts 
did not consider whether the Hertz test is inappropriate for a 
personal jurisdiction analysis. As a result, courts currently 
treat the principal place of business in general jurisdiction cas-
es in a similar manner as they assess it in diversity cases.178 
2. Differences Between Diversity Jurisdiction and Personal  
Jurisdiction 
There are substantial differences between diversity juris-
diction and personal jurisdiction. First and foremost, statutory 
limitations restrict the scope of diversity jurisdiction.179 The 
Constitution provides the judiciary the power that “shall ex-
tend to . . . Controversies . . . between Citizens of different 
states.”180 It does not, however, “automatically confer diversity 
jurisdiction upon the federal courts.”181 Only Congress can au-
thorize and determine the scope of the federal court jurisdic-
tion.182 The outer limit of the federal courts’ diversity jurisdic-
tion is set by the diversity statute. 
In contrast, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
 175. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). 
 176. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., No. 1:14 CV 
329, slip op. at 4 n.3 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2014) (“The Supreme Court has de-
fined a corporation’s principal place of business as its ‘nerve center’ . . . . ‘In 
practice it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its 
headquarters . . . .’” (quoting Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93)); Flynn v. Hovensa, 
LLC, No. 3:14 Civ. 43, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Penn. July 3, 2014) (“A corporation’s 
principal place of business is its ‘nerve center.’”). 
 177. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 
2014); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221, 225–26 
(2d Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 178. Compare Gucci, 768 F.3d at 122 (personal jurisdiction case), with 
Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (diversity jurisdiction case). 
 179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012). 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 181. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 84. 
 182. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1922). 
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Amendment limits the power of personal jurisdiction.183 Even if 
it is constitutionally permissible for a court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation, that court might still lack the 
power to hear the case. The Due Process Clause only defines 
the outer boundary of permissible judicial power.184 Similar to 
the diversity statute, the state legislature must authorize the 
courts to exercise that jurisdiction.185 In most states, the long-
arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause.186 
Additionally, the doctrines serve vastly different purposes. 
The primary purpose, for instance, of diversity jurisdiction is to 
open federal courts’ doors to those who might suffer from local 
prejudice against out-of-state parties.187 Congress believed that 
a corporation has a fair chance to avoid local prejudice if it has 
an established center of business within the state. Another im-
petus for Congress’ modification of the diversity statute to in-
clude “principal place of business” was the increased size of the 
federal docket.188 Corporations manipulated their state of incor-
poration to obtain diversity jurisdiction, and, as a result, these 
cases flooded the federal docket.189 In light of this pressing con-
cern, Congress widened the definition of corporate citizenship 
under the diversity statute in order to prevent clogging of the 
federal docket with corporation diversity cases. 
As discussed earlier, the limitations of general jurisdiction 
 
 183. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 184. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
2846, 2853 (2011) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to proceed against a 
defendant.”). 
 185. See Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (“[T]he district court’s personal jurisdiction over a non-resident de-
fendant is governed by the forum’s long-arm statute.” (quoting American Ex-
press Int’l Inc. v. Mendez-Capellan, 889 F.2d 1175, 1178 (1st Cir. 1989))); 
Savin v. Ranier, 898 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[F]ederal courts must look 
to the forum state’s long-arm statute to determine if personal jurisdiction may 
be obtained over a nonresident defendant.”). 
 186. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (“A court of this 
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Consti-
tution of this state or of the United States.”). For a broader discussion on the 
long-arm statutes of the fifty states, see VEDDER PRICE, LONG-ARM STATUTES: 
A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY (2003), http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08 
-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf. 
 187. See Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855). 
 188. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 86 (2010) (“At the same time 
as federal dockets increased in size, many judges began to believe those dock-
ets contained too many diversity cases.”). 
 189. Id. 
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are different than those of diversity jurisdiction.190 States can 
exercise personal jurisdiction because of their sovereign author-
ity.191 The restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
are a “matter of individual liberty.”192 In other words, diversity 
jurisdiction asks which court, state or federal, is the proper ad-
judicator within a forum state. Personal jurisdiction asks if the 
forum state even has the power to adjudicate the issue. 
To superimpose the restrictions of a statutory limitation, 
crafted by Congress for an entirely different purpose, upon a 
constitutionally defined doctrine constitutes judicial overreach. 
States could have chosen to create additional restrictions on the 
exercise of general jurisdiction. For example, Ohio state courts 
do not interpret the long-arm statute to extend to the limits of 
due process.193 Instead, states have chosen to make their long-
arm statutes coextensive with the Constitution. Restrictions on 
general jurisdiction that extend beyond the constitutional limit 
should be determined by the state legislatures, not the courts. 
The cost of such an arbitrary restriction is the infringement of 
the sovereign power of the states.194 
B. THE CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
Demonstrating that general jurisdiction could be more ex-
pansive is different from proving that it should be expanded.195 
This Section provides that justification. It argues that the vari-
ety of ways in which corporations organize their corporate func-
tions presents a unique challenge to the current general juris-
diction doctrine. 
1. The Federalism Problem: Unnecessary Restraints on State  
Sovereignty 
On its face, the M-form corporation does not present any 
unique problem for the general jurisdiction doctrine. Even 
 
 190. See supra Part I.B. 
 191. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011). 
 192. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 (1982) (“The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not 
from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction re-
quirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.”). 
 193. See Hoover Co. v. Robeson Indus. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 671, 673 (N.D. 
Ohio 1995); see also OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2307.382 (West 2015). 
 194. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 195. See Stein, supra note 43, at 548 (“Why should general jurisdiction be 
more expansive?”). 
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though the corporation delegates part of the corporate function 
to a divisional office, that office might still reside in the same 
state as the corporate headquarters. In that instance, the M-
form corporation is no more difficult of a case than the U-form 
corporation. 
The decentralization of the M-form, however, allows a cor-
poration to disperse its corporate functions nationally. Take, for 
example, the prototypical M-form corporation: General Motors 
(GM).196 GM maintains its corporate headquarters in Detroit, 
Michigan.197 Recently, GM gave Cadillac, a divisional branch of 
the corporation, the authority to establish a headquarters in 
New York.198 The Cadillac headquarters operates as a “separate 
business unit” that can “pursue growing opportunities in the 
luxury automotive market.”199 Johan de Nysschen, who serves 
as the President of Cadillac and the General Motors Executive 
Vice President, manages the Cadillac office.200 This GM set-up 
demonstrates the limitations of the current general jurisdiction 
doctrine. 
Given that GM maintains its headquarters in Michigan, 
courts would likely view Michigan as GM’s principal place of 
business. By conflating the principal place of business with the 
Hertz test, courts restrict the general jurisdiction fora by as-
suming that only a single location qualifies as the principal 
place of business.201 This approach implicates the balance of 
horizontal federalism.202 If general jurisdiction is proper in 
Michigan because GM determines and directs its long-term 
 
 196. See Haiwen Zhou, Market Structure and Organizational Form, 71 S. 
ECON. J. 705, 705 (2005) (“An example of an M-form firm is the General Mo-
tors Company.”); see also CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 158–60 (describing the 
organizational structure of General Motors). 
 197. Company Profile for General Motors Co (GM), BLOOMBERG, http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/quote/GM:US (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
 198. Dale Buss, Cadillac Moves HQ to New York as New Chief De Nysschen 
Holds Sway, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dalebuss/ 
2014/09/23/cadillac-moves-hq-to-new-york-as-new-chief-de-nysschen-holds 
-sway. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Leadership: Corporate Officers, GEN. MOTORS, http://www.gm 
.com/company/leadership/corporate-officers.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
 201. See, e.g., Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221, 
225–26 (2d Cir. 2014) (identifying the principal place of business as a single 
location); Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (lim-
iting the fora of general jurisdiction to the place of incorporation and principal 
place of business). 
 202. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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strategy,203 why is New York precluded from exercising general 
jurisdiction? After all, the New York office serves a corporate 
function; it manages the day-to-day operations and direction of 
the Cadillac product.204  
Absent a constitutional constraint, the current doctrine 
“unduly curtails” New York’s sovereign authority to adjudicate 
disputes against corporate defendants.205 The requirement that 
the principal place of business exist in a single state is a crea-
ture of statutory limitation.206 As discussed above, this limita-
tion derives from both the text of the diversity statute and its 
legislative history.207 In contrast, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the constitutional restriction on per-
sonal jurisdiction.208 This Note argues that there is no Due Pro-
cess consideration involved with expanding the general juris-
diction doctrine to include GM’s office in New York.209 
Therefore, the narrow scope of general jurisdiction fora infring-
es on the fifty States’ “status as coequal sovereigns in a federal 
system.”210 
2. Asymmetric Consequences: Separating the Headquarters  
from the Control of Daily Operations 
A common reorganization strategy of corporations is to 
separate the control of daily operations from the headquarters, 
placing the former function in another office, usually in another 
state. The separation of the corporate headquarters from other 
corporate functions, such as control of daily operations, creates 
a jurisdictional gap. Mountain State Carbon illustrates this 
point. In Central West Virginia Energy Co. v. Mountain State 
Carbon, LLC, Severstal Wheeling maintained a corporate office 
in Michigan where its officers “are responsible for significant 
oversight and strategic decision-making at Severstal Wheel-
 
 203. Cf. Chandler, supra note 139. 
 204. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also su-
pra Part I.A.3. 
 206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012). 
 207. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 208. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (“Since the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the validity of [personal jurisdiction] may be 
directly questioned, and . . . resisted, on the grounds that proceedings . . . do 
not constitute due process of law.”). 
 209. See infra Part III. 
 210. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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ing.”211 At the same time, the office did not manage the day-to-
day operations.212 That management occurred in Wheeling, 
West Virginia.213 These activities included purchasing materi-
als, selling products, managing environmental compliance, and 
administering human resources matters such as payroll.214 In 
essence, Wheeling is where the corporation conducted its “daily 
management activities.”215 
Following the Hertz rule, the Fourth Circuit determined 
that the corporation’s principal place of business was in Michi-
gan, where “nearly all of the high-level officers work, make sig-
nificant corporate decisions, and set corporate policy.”216 This 
demonstrates that the Hertz rule is an inflexible test for the 
manner that corporations organize their operations. The Hertz 
Court recognized this problem,217 but faced statutory limitations 
of the diversity statute.218 Under the corporate general jurisdic-
tion doctrine, only Michigan can exercise general jurisdiction 
over Severstal Wheeling because that is the state where 
Severstal Wheeling maintains its headquarters.219  
Consider that a citizen of Michigan that does temporary 
steel work in West Virginia for Severstal Wheeling may sue in 
Michigan. For any court, this scenario is clear cut because 
Severstal Wheeling’s headquarters resides in Michigan. How-
ever, imagine a citizen of West Virginia, who is a steel worker 
for Severstal Wheeling, transports steel sheets to a client in 
Maryland. In Maryland, the truck malfunctions, causing a 
crash. The accident report details negligent maintenance of the 
truck as the primary cause of the accident. If a court concludes 
that the accident is unrelated to Severstal Wheeling’s activities 
 
 211. 636 F.3d 101, 104–05 (4th Cir. 2011). Although the issue in Mountain 
State Carbon was ultimately one of diversity jurisdiction, the fact pattern 
demonstrates how different corporate structures may complicate the general 
jurisdiction analysis. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 105. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. at 106–07 (“[E]mployees in Wheeling, West Virginia ‘are en-
gaged in nearly all facets of the company’s operations’ and . . . ‘managing [of] 
the company’s operations occur[s] in Wheeling.’” (last alteration in original)). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95–96 (2010). 
 218. Id. at 93 (arguing that the words “place” and “principal” denote a sin-
gular location); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012). 
 219. Again, the issues involved in Mountain State Carbon, namely a coal 
supply agreement with a West Virginian company, would likely give West Vir-
ginia specific personal jurisdiction over Severstal Wheeling. 
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in West Virginia, could the injured steel worker bring a suit 
against Severstal Wheeling in West Virginia? The answer is 
likely no. Although Severstal Wheeling directs its steel making 
operation out of its West Virginia office, that office is not the 
company’s headquarters. Thus, the steel worker could only 
bring a suit in Michigan, where the headquarters is located. 
Is it fair that only Michigan serves as a general jurisdiction 
forum for Severstal Wheeling? The West Virginia office has the 
authority to purchase materials, sell products, manage envi-
ronmental compliance, and administer human resource mat-
ters.220 In the injured steel worker’s case, the corporate authori-
ty that pulled the proverbial trigger on the negligent 
maintenance of the truck resides in West Virginia. In fact, the 
West Virginia office directs the impact of Severstal Wheeling’s 
daily operations, no matter where they occur in the United 
States. The availability of general jurisdiction in Michigan and 
its absence in West Virginia demonstrates the asymmetric na-
ture of the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine. Severstal 
Wheeling exercises corporate functions in both states. However, 
only Michigan may exert general jurisdiction in response to 
Severstal Wheeling’s activity. Thus, it offends traditional no-
tions of justice that, despite the extensive reach from West Vir-
ginia, Severstal Wheeling is immune from suits on general 
matters in West Virginia.  
3. The Problem Replicated in Branch Offices and Franchise  
Arrangements 
As illustrated above, decentralized corporate structures 
present two challenges to the corporate general jurisdiction 
doctrine: (1) they restrict the states’ exercise of their sovereign-
ty through general jurisdiction; and (2) they produce asymmet-
ric consequences for the exercise of corporate functions. Both of 
these challenges arise in two other common corporate ar-
rangements: branch offices and franchise arrangements.  
M-form corporations also delegate the command and con-
trol functions of the general office by creating regional offices.221 
A common form of this delegation is the branch office. The 
branch office manages part of the corporation’s day-to-day op-
erations.222 This characteristic raises the question of what kind 
of management power confers general jurisdiction. The delega-
 
 220. See Mountain State Carbon, 636 F.3d at 105. 
 221. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 222. See Chandler, supra note 139. 
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tion of authority to branch offices is a purposeful decision by 
the corporation. On one hand, the headquarters makes strategy 
decisions, such as product positioning and advertising.223 On the 
other hand, the branches make the decisions about implemen-
tation and execution of those strategy decisions.224 By diffusing 
the power to manage day-to-day operations to branches, a cor-
poration prevents its headquarters from becoming overloaded 
with information and duties—the result is profitability and 
greater efficiency.225 
Even though the branches in M-form corporations exercise 
traditional corporate functions, these offices escape the grasp of 
general jurisdiction. Prior to Daimler, courts often found that 
states had general jurisdiction over corporations through their 
branch offices.226 The scope of general jurisdiction changed after 
that decision. Consider, for example, Gucci America, Inc. v. 
Weixing Li, in which the Second Circuit held that the Bank of 
China (BOC) was not subject to general jurisdiction in New 
York as a result of its New York branch.227 Clearly, the BOC is 
neither incorporated nor holds its principal place of business in 
New York.228 A critical characteristic of the New York branch of 
the BOC is that it does not have “possession or control over in-
formation located ‘in any other branch or office of the Bank of 
China.’”229 The Second Circuit believed that Daimler “cast[s] 
doubt” on New York’s tradition of finding general jurisdiction 
over local branches “doing business” in the forum.230 This gap 
further exemplifies the asymmetry of general jurisdiction—by 
ignoring how corporations delegate and restructure traditional 
corporate functions, the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine 
allows for the exercise of these functions without the risk of ex-
posure to all-purpose jurisdiction. 
 
 223. See David A. Garvin & Lynne C. Levesque, The Multiunit Enterprise, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2008), https://hbr.org/2008/06/the-multiunit-enterprise. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Chandler, supra note 139. 
 226. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916–17 (N.Y. 
1917); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(“Prior to Daimler, controlling precedent in this Circuit made it clear that a 
foreign bank with a branch in New York was properly subject to general per-
sonal jurisdiction here.”). For further examples of pre-Daimler cases, see Wiwa 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95 (2d Cir. 2000); Hoffritz for 
Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 227. 768 F.3d at 129. 
 228. Id. at 126. 
 229. Id. at 127. 
 230. Id. at 135. 
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A corporation arranged as a franchise presents a similar 
jurisdictional problem. Consider the facts of Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz.231 Burger King oversees its franchise system 
through a two-tiered structure.232 The contracts headquarters, 
based in Miami “sets policy and works directly with its fran-
chisees in attempting to resolve major problems,”233 while the 
day-to-day management of the franchisees is managed by a 
network of ten district offices, which report to the Miami of-
fice.234 Burger King is a Florida corporation whose principal of-
fices are in Miami.235 The Florida courts clearly have general 
jurisdiction over any claim as Florida is both the state of incor-
poration and home to the principal place of business.  
The asymmetry occurs, however, when considering the role 
of the franchises. Assume that Burger King enters a franchise 
agreement with a Missouri business. Burger King’s Chicago 
district office is responsible for managing all franchises in the 
Midwest, including Missouri. The Chicago office directs the 
business of the Missouri franchise, including product line-up, 
employment contracts, and financing. Imagine that a Chicago 
Cubs fan travels to St. Louis to observe the heated rivalry be-
tween the Cardinals and the Cubs. After eating at the Missouri 
franchise, the fan is infected with salmonella. The Chicago of-
fice directed the purchase of beef that is responsible for the 
salmonella infection. Again, the asymmetric nature of the gen-
eral jurisdiction doctrine prevents the Cubs fan from suing 
Burger King in Chicago. 
4. The Principal Place of Business Test Gets It Right for  
Centralized Corporations 
Despite these shortcomings, the search for the principal 
place of business, or its functional equivalent, makes sense 
when the corporation adopts a centralized structure. The Hertz 
test relies on a single center for direction, control, and coordi-
nation of the corporation’s activities.236 Consequently, the cen-
tralized nature of the U-form structure is an ideal characteris-
tic for this test because all the corporate functions are located 
in the general offices. The corporate headquarters is easily as-
 
 231. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 232. Id. at 465. 
 233. Id. at 466. 
 234. Id. at 465–66. 
 235. Id. at 464. 
 236. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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certainable because many corporations openly provide their lo-
cations and list the corporate officers that work there on the 
company website.237 Additionally, the single location avoids the 
possibility that a court must choose between two different 
states. Although there is a chance that a U-form corporation 
might maintain some of its high-level officers in another 
state,238 its structure generally requires a central location of 
corporate control. Unfortunately, U-form corporations are not 
the only corporate structure, and, in fact, are less prevalent 
than the multidivisional structure. 
III.  ADOPTING A BROADER DEFINITION OF CORPORATE 
ACTIVITIES   
Showing that the current general jurisdiction doctrine does 
not account for the variety of corporate structures is, of course, 
not the endpoint of this Note. Courts should abandon the nar-
row limitations of the Hertz test, and should instead adapt the 
general jurisdiction doctrine to corporate structure. Section A 
introduces the notion of “corporate functions” and provides a 
definition of the concept. Section B explains the advantages of 
this definition. Section C concludes by describing how this defi-
nition is consistent with jurisdictional theory.  
A. GENERAL JURISDICTION SHOULD FOLLOW CORPORATE  
STRUCTURE 
The current general jurisdiction doctrine does not account 
for corporations that decentralize their organizational struc-
ture. In light of this deficiency, how can courts adjust the gen-
eral corporate jurisdiction rule? The answer is simple: general 
jurisdiction must follow corporate structure. Courts can reach 
this ideal by finding a corporation subject to general jurisdic-
tion in any state in which the corporation exercises a corporate 
function. Corporate functions are those that normally occur in 
the traditional headquarters.239 There are two corporate func-
 
 237. See, e.g., Global Locations, A BULLSEYE VIEW, https://corporate 
.target.com/careers/global-locations (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); Mailing Ad-
dresses, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/help/addresses (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2016). 
 238. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010). 
 239. Cf. Chandler, supra note 139 (“[T]he executives at the new headquar-
ters carried out two closely related functions. . . . [First,] determine strategies 
to maintain and then utilize for the long-term the firm’s organizational skills, 
facilities and capital and to allocate resources . . . . The second was more ad-
ministrative or loss-preventive.”). 
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tions: (1) the direction of all activities in furtherance of the cor-
porate objective; and (2) the command and control of day-to-day 
operations.240 So, when a corporation decentralizes its opera-
tions by moving a corporate function (i.e., the command and 
control of day-to-day operations) to an office in another state, 
general jurisdiction would follow that corporation to that state. 
To put it differently, the corporate functions test focuses on 
the corporation’s structure rather than the corporation’s activi-
ties. To illustrate this difference, recall the Mountain State 
Carbon case, in which Severstal Wheeling had two offices—a 
corporate headquarters in Michigan and an office in West Vir-
ginia to manage the day-to-day operations. Applying the Hertz 
test, a court would look for Severstal Wheeling’s “center of di-
rection, control, and coordination.”241 However, this analysis as-
sumes that all of these functions occur in the same place and, 
therefore, Severstal Wheeling presented a difficult case. On one 
hand, the direction of Severstal Wheeling’s activities happens 
in Michigan. On the other hand, the control and coordination of 
those activities takes place in West Virginia. 
Direction and coordination refers to where a corporation 
plans, appraises, and determines the corporation’s overall goals 
and policies.242 These decisions occur on the macro level and are 
likely directed by high-level corporate officers including the 
chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief finan-
cial officer.243 For example, a corporate headquarters where a 
CEO makes investment decisions and product line development 
plans is a place from which the corporation directs its activities. 
In contrast, a branch office that implements the decisions of the 
corporate headquarters does not direct the corporation’s activi-
ties. 
Control refers to where the corporation manages the day-
to-day operations. Although Severstal Wheeling’s steel opera-
tions happen in West Virginia, the defining feature of the cor-
porate function inquiry is Severstal Wheeling’s control over 
those operations. It is important to note that the corporate 
function is the control over the day-to-day operations and not 
the operations themselves. To illustrate this difference, Moun-
 
 240. Id. 
 241. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93. 
 242. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 9 (providing an overview of the tasks 
undertaken at different levels of administration). 
 243. See Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 
101, 105 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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tain State Carbon is again useful. The West Virginia office 
managed the steel operation by purchasing materials, contract-
ing to sell products, managing administrative compliance, and 
administering human resource matters.244 The steel operation 
itself is the production of steel sheets. Because Severstal 
Wheeling manages the steel operation from the West Virginia 
office, general jurisdiction would be proper under the corporate 
functions test. However, if Severstal Wheeling consolidated the 
management of the steel operation to its office in Michigan, 
general jurisdiction would not be proper in West Virginia, even 
though Severstal Wheeling continued to make steel sheets in 
West Virginia. Thus, the command and control of daily opera-
tions does not include the actual day-to-day operations them-
selves. 
The corporate function test unchains the general jurisdic-
tion inquiry from the bounds of the Hertz principal place of 
business test. By doing so, the test eliminates an artificial con-
straint on state sovereignty, which the courts have superim-
posed on the states from Congress’ diversity jurisdiction stat-
ute. Furthermore, the corporate functions test provides states 
with the flexibility to exercise jurisdiction over corporations 
when they exert corporate functions from within their borders. 
Recall the Mountain State Carbon case.245 Because Severstal 
Wheeling delegated control over its day-to-day operations to the 
West Virginia office, West Virginia would be able to hold 
Severstal Wheeling accountable for its corporate actions. 
The corporate functions test fills the gaping hole left by the 
mismatch between judicial doctrine and corporate structure. 
The exercise of corporate functions would no longer result in 
asymmetric consequences. If the branch of a corporation man-
ages the day-to-day operations of the corporation’s activities, 
then the corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in that 
state. This analysis holds true for the franchise arrangements 
as well. Recall the facts of Burger King.246 Although the Miami 
office directs the strategic decision-making, the headquarters 
delegated the command and control of day-to-day operations to 
the district offices.247 The regional offices serve as a divisional 
office in an M-form corporation. Under the corporate-business 
activities distinction, Burger King would be amenable to suit on 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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an unrelated cause of action in Chicago, the location of the 
franchise office, because it conducts corporate activity in the 
state. 
B. ADVANTAGES OF THE CORPORATE FUNCTIONS DEFINITION 
The corporate functions definition provides the best expla-
nation for general jurisdiction, and offers several advantages. 
First, it is a narrow approach that emphasizes characteristics 
of corporations that tend to be limited by nature. The prolifera-
tion of high-level corporate activity is inefficient and runs coun-
ter to the current corporate trend.248 A narrow approach is 
clearly favored after Daimler.249 Although the Daimler inquiry 
is simpler, the corporate functions test does not substantially 
expand the reach of general jurisdiction. In order for a corpora-
tion to be subject to general jurisdiction under this Note’s ap-
proach, a corporation must delegate corporate functions to an 
office. These functions are limited and finite. 
Second, it creates a predictable and stable reasoning for 
courts to follow. The lower courts have had difficulty applying 
the Court’s prior general jurisdiction rules in a consistent man-
ner.250 The most difficult cases arise when decentralized corpo-
rate structures are present.251 The Supreme Court has already 
 
 248. See HANS D. BAUMANN, BUILDING LEAN COMPANIES: HOW TO KEEP 
COMPANIES PROFITABLE AS THEY GROW 17 (2009) (“[Too many layers of man-
agement] can place a burden on support services analogous to the burden 
placed on the heart of an obese animal . . . .”). Contra Michael Goold & S. Da-
vid Young, When Lean Isn’t Mean, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2005), https:// 
hbr.org/2005/04/when-lean-isnt-mean (suggesting empirical evidence might 
not support the thesis that “a lean and mean headquarters is associated with 
superior financial performance”). 
 249. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“[O]nly a lim-
ited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-
purpose jurisdiction . . . .”); Colin T. Kemp et al., Daimler AG v. Bauman: 
Court Again Rejects a “Sprawling View of General Jurisdiction,” PILLSBURY 
(Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/daimler-ag-v 
-bauman-court-again-rejects-a-sprawling-jurisdiction (“[T]he circumstances [in 
which one can sue a corporation under general jurisdiction in a forum other 
than the state of incorporation or home of the principal place of business] are 
vanishingly narrow.”). 
 250. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 
SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 829–34 (2004) (describing the various inconsistent 
applications of general jurisdiction). 
 251. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 
2014) (exemplifying the branch office problem); Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. 
Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 107 n.3 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We rec-
ognize that the proliferation of complex corporate structures among business 
enterprises may compel further attention to the issue of ‘principal place of 
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acknowledged the “easily ascertainable” nature of high-level 
corporate activities.252 By providing a doctrine which can be 
consistently applied, the corporate functions definition will help 
corporations structure their conduct253 and make better busi-
ness and investment decisions.254 
Third, it avoids the problem of corporate “presence.” Courts 
have struggled to abandon the fiction of corporate “presence.”255 
This is in part due to a historical reliance on this concept256 and 
the Supreme Court’s failure to reject traditional indicia of cor-
porate “presence” in its general jurisdiction cases.257 The corpo-
rate functions definition distinction involves factors that are 
distinct enough from the prior “presence” test.258 Prior theories 
of general jurisdiction focus on the corporation’s activities ra-
ther than how the corporation is structured.259 The corporate 
functions test removes corporate activities, such as sales, man-
ufacturing, and production, from the analysis. Instead, the in-
quiry solely focuses on the corporation’s structure and how it 
delegates corporate functions. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
 
business’. . . .”). 
 252. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (“Those affiliations have the virtue of 
being . . . easily ascertainable.”); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010) 
(“A ‘nerve center’ approach . . . is simple to apply comparatively speaking.”). 
 253. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980) (“The Due Process Clause . . . gives a degree of predictability to the le-
gal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct 
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not ren-
der them liable to suit.”). 
 254. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94. 
 255. See, e.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 256. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 
1917) (“All that is requisite [for jurisdiction] is that enough be done to enable 
us to say that the corporation is here.”). 
 257. The Supreme Court continues to list the factors of corporate “pres-
ence” in its general jurisdiction decisions. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court does not dispute . . . the presence of 
[Daimler’s] multiple offices, the direct distribution of thousands of products 
accounting for billions of dollars in sales, and continuous interaction with cus-
tomers . . . .”); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
411 (1984) (“Helicol never has owned real or personal property in Texas and 
never has maintained an office or establishment there.”); Perkins v. Benguet 
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952) (“There [Benguet’s president] 
maintained an office in which he . . . did many things on behalf of the compa-
ny.”). 
 258. Compare supra Part I.A (describing the factors of corporate presence), 
with supra Part III.A (describing the factors of corporate functions). 
 259. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 
411–12. 
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courts will revert to a reliance on corporate “presence” in a “rit-
ualistic application” of the proposed solution.260 
One risk of the corporate functions definition is that it 
might cause corporations to shift from a multidivisional struc-
ture to a multisubsidiary one. Some corporations have already 
made a transition away from MDF to MSF because of incen-
tives created by corporate tax reform.261 The possibility that the 
former might incur more litigation liability than the latter 
might also incentivize corporations to switch. 
This reaction, however, should not be considered a disad-
vantage of the distinction. A central tenet of general jurisdic-
tion is that corporations should be afforded the opportunity “to 
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance 
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit.”262 If, following the adoption of the corporate functions def-
inition, corporations choose to reorganize, it will be an indica-
tion that the doctrine of general jurisdiction is operating as it 
should. 
C. THE CORPORATE FUNCTIONS DEFINITION IS BASED ON A  
STRONG THEORETICAL RATIONALE 
Showing that the corporate functions definition offers sev-
eral advantages is, of course, only a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for its adoption. A desirable proposal must also rest 
on a strong theoretical rationale. Although the corporate func-
tions definition might be an arbitrary line, as all lines tend to 
be, it is consistent with general jurisdiction theories. Given the 
lack of theoretical foundation of general jurisdiction,263 in par-
ticular as applied to doing business jurisdiction, a strong con-
sistency with jurisdiction theory sets this line apart from other 
approaches. This Section explores how the corporate-business 
activities distinction fits with various theories. 
1. The Corporate Functions Test Provides Reciprocal  
Consequences for Benefits 
The corporate functions definition fits well with a theory of 
 
 260. Edmond R. Anderson, Jr., Personal Jurisdiction over Outsiders, 28 
MO. L. REV. 336, 383–84 (1963). 
 261. See Zey & Swenson, supra note 160, at 242. 
 262. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); 
see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). 
 263. See supra Part I.A. 
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reciprocity.264 Corporate functions govern and control business 
activities.265 Decisions made at the corporate level “encompass[] 
every phase of [a corporation’s]’ activities—production, sales, 
distribution, advertising, public relations and all other related 
facets.”266 In other words, no aspect of the corporation’s activi-
ties escapes the management of high-level officers. 
As a result, all of the corporate functions will have a con-
nection to the policies and decisions made in states where there 
is corporate activity. Consider a mining corporation with its 
headquarters in Ohio but mining activities in another state or 
country. Even though the mining operations do not take place 
in Ohio, the headquarters directed those activities from that 
state. For instance, the corporate activity in Ohio sets produc-
tion limits, determines payment rates of the miners, and en-
sures compliance with various mining regulations. In this 
sense, the corporate functions are connected with every state in 
which the corporation conducts mining activities. 
To put this characteristic in contrast with the mining oper-
ations, imagine that a court provides general jurisdiction over 
the Ohio corporation because of its mining operations in Virgin-
ia. Unlike the corporate activities in Ohio, the mining opera-
tions only have a relationship to the state of Virginia. It is 
proper for Virginia to regulate the effects of those activities, 
and it can do so under specific jurisdiction.267 It fails any com-
monplace sense of reciprocity that the local activity of mining 
operations gives Virginia authority over activities having no 
connection to those mining operations.268 The burden of all-
purpose jurisdiction in return for the corporation’s privileges 
and protection to mine in Virginia is likely to be “far more se-
vere” and, therefore, be far from reciprocal.269 
 
 264. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 728–29. 
 265. See Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 26, at 1144–63 (de-
scribing the applications of specific jurisdiction). 
 268. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014) (“Nothing 
in International Shoe and its progeny suggests that ‘a particular quantum of 
local activity’ should give a State authority over a ‘far larger quantum of . . . 
activity’ having no connection to any in-state activity.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Feder, supra note 14, at 694)). 
 269. See Feder, supra note 14, at 694. 
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2. The Corporate Functions Test Aligns with State  
Sovereignty 
Limiting general jurisdiction to a corporation’s principal 
place of business is far too narrow of a view.270 State sovereign 
authority to adjudicate disputes should only be limited by the 
Due Process Clause and the federalist structure.271 The princi-
pal place of business is a creature of statute.272 Imposing such a 
limitation, crafted by Congress for an entirely different pur-
pose, upon a doctrine limited only by the Constitution consti-
tutes judicial overreach. The cost of such an arbitrary re-
striction is the infringement of the sovereign power of the 
states.273  
The corporate functions definition offers a slightly broader 
view of proper jurisdiction. Although the divisional offices of an 
M-form corporation might not make a corporation a citizen of 
the forum state, the relationship between the office and the fo-
rum state is no less potent. As discussed above, each of the cor-
porate functions demonstrate a similar level of reciprocity and 
predictability.  
3. The Corporate Functions Test Promotes Forum Certainty 
The necessity of providing a plaintiff a certain forum in 
which it can sue a corporation offers a weak theoretical justifi-
cation.274 If this is the underlying basis for jurisdiction, then 
Daimler, and by extension Goodyear, has already exceeded this 
purpose by providing not one but two potential fora.275 The cur-
rent scope of general jurisdiction, as a result, might actually be 
an over-inclusive means to serve a plaintiff’s convenience. In 
order to serve the purpose of providing a certain forum, only 
the state of incorporation is necessary because every corpora-
 
 270. See Blanchard, supra note 14, at 900 (“A corporation is ‘at home’ only 
in its state of incorporation and in the one state where its principal place of 
business, or nerve center, is located.”). 
 271. See Part I.A. 
 272. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 273. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Yet [the 
majority] never explains why the State should lose [the power to adjudicate] 
when . . . a corporation ‘divide[s] [its] command and coordinating functions 
among officers who work at several different locations.’”). 
 274. See id. at 760 (majority opinion) (“These bases afford plaintiffs 
recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant 
may be sued on any and all claims.”). 
 275. See id. (identifying the place of incorporation and the principal place 
of business as paradigm fora); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011) (making the same identification). 
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tion must be incorporated. As a result, every plaintiff would 
have some forum in which to pursue a corporate defendant. 
Therefore, forum certainty might be part of the reasoning be-
hind the Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction cases, but not a 
dispositive one. The other justifications offer a countervailing 
explanation that justifies the corporate functions definition. 
To be sure, Daimler promotes greater forum certainty—a 
court only needs to look for the corporation’s headquarters or 
the state of incorporation. In contrast, the corporate functions 
test requires courts to discern the internal organization of a 
corporation. Many of these functions might not be readily ap-
parent to a court without intricate knowledge of the corpora-
tion’s structure. Jurisdictional discovery mitigates the impact 
of any uncertainty.276 If a defendant asserts a defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction, a court may permit discovery of jurisdic-
tional facts.277 Thus, discovery and admissions of corporate 
structure would simplify the jurisdictional inquiry.  
4. The Corporate Functions Test Is More Predictable 
The corporate function approach would also make the gen-
eral jurisdiction doctrine more predictable and consistent. To be 
sure, the place of incorporation and principal place of business 
are excellent paradigm fora. Both tend to be clear and readily 
apparent.278 When a corporation is sued in neither of the para-
digm fora, the courts struggle to consistently rationalize their 
decisions.279 Far more often, however, courts constrain their 
 
 276. See generally S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States 
Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2010) (describing the 
role of discovery in determining the existence of personal jurisdiction). Justice 
Ginsburg believes that the Daimler standard negates the need for jurisdic-
tional discovery. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. 
 277. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978) 
(“[W]here issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to as-
certain the facts bearing on such issues.”); Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989). A court, however, is not required to 
grant jurisdictional discovery. See Strong, supra note 276, at 524–32 (explain-
ing the highly discretionary process by which courts determine whether to or-
der jurisdictional discovery). 
 278. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 279. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 
2014) (expressing that the existence of a local office is “clearly not ‘an excep-
tional case’” (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19)); Martinez v. Aero Car-
ibbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting both the plaintiff’s tag 
jurisdiction argument and exceptional case argument for personal jurisdic-
tion); Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-542-JL, 2015 WL 
3506517, at *6 (D.N.H. June 3, 2015) (equating the exceptional case require-
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analysis to comparing the facts of the case before them with 
those of prior Supreme Court cases.280 The problem is that the 
courts do not have a set of factors that help them identify “ex-
ceptional cases.”281 Put differently, courts do not ask why a case 
is not “exceptional.” How then can a court properly identify 
when a case is exceptional? 
It is possible that the courts are getting the right results, 
but doctrine without a clear rationale might be why Daimler’s 
clarification was necessary at all.282 The corporate function ap-
proach make courts’ exercise of general jurisdiction more pre-
dictable. First, a test that reflects how corporations are actually 
structured should promote accuracy.283 Courts do not substitute 
their own expertise for that of a corporation’s business ra-
tionale.284 Similarly, courts should not ignore how corporations 
choose to organize their business. Second, much like the Hertz 
test, the corporate function approach does not require courts to 
assess a corporation’s business activities.285 When courts look to 
those business activities, the doctrine “invites greater litigation 
and can lead to strange results.”286 The most recent cases on 
general jurisdiction indicate that the courts may be headed 
down this path.287 The corporate function approach eliminates 
that unpredictability. 
5. The Theoretical Support Is Similarly Strong for the  
Management of Day-to-Day Operations 
It is possible that the totality of corporate functions aligns 
properly with the general jurisdiction theories, but each func-
 
ment with a search for a “surrogate for [a corporation’s] principal place of 
business”); Stroud v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 381, 388–89 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015) (rejecting the existence of manufacturing plants as an exceptional case); 
Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F. Supp. 3d 97, 104–05 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting website activity as an exceptional case). 
 280. See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 745 F.3d 
30, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2014); Chatwal Hotels & Resorts, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 104. 
 281. See supra note 279. 
 282. See generally Twitchell, supra note 14, at 629–30 (arguing that gen-
eral jurisdiction’s difficult application results in confusion and unpredictabil-
ity). 
 283. See Rautenstrauch v. Stern/Leach Co., No. Civ.A 03-10723-DPW, 2004 
WL 42573, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2004) (“[C]ourts must be careful to consider 
the fit of model to reality . . . .”). 
 284. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974) (explain-
ing the “business judgment rule”). 
 285. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93–94 (2010). 
 286. Id. at 94. 
 287. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text. 
Chung_4FMT  
2016] THE SHOE DOESN’T FIT 1641 
 
tion independently might not. Recall that there are two corpo-
rate functions: the direction of long-term strategy of the corpo-
ration and the management of the corporation’s day-to-day op-
erations. The former function is the least susceptible to this 
criticism for two reasons. First, the corporate headquarters, in 
any organization structure, directs its long-term strategy.288 
Courts have consistently viewed the corporate headquarters as 
the principal place of business, and, therefore, a proper forum 
for general jurisdiction.289 Second, there is nothing inherently 
unfair about asserting jurisdiction in a state where a corpora-
tion keeps it corporate headquarters. A corporation expects to 
be sued in that state and structures its business accordingly 
with a legal support team and intricate knowledge of the state’s 
laws.290 
Courts might not believe that corporation’s management of 
day-to-day operations hold equal weight to the functions of a 
corporate headquarters, especially if these functions occur in an 
office in a different state. The management of day-to-day opera-
tions, however, is an important function that should confer 
general jurisdiction. This function is integral to the success of 
the corporation.291 In fact, corporations choose to delegate the 
function to divisional offices because of the related economic 
benefits and managing advantages.292 The divisional headquar-
ters also have a national, rather than local, reach.293 The corpo-
ration derives unique benefits from the divisional office, both 
through economic gains and organizational efficiency, and, as 
such, it avails itself of the benefits of the state in which it’s lo-
cated. Therefore, the management function of a corporation is 
equally weighty in the jurisdictional context and should justify 
the exercise of general jurisdiction. 
 
 288. See supra Part II.B. 
 289. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“The majority does not dispute that a State can exercise general 
jurisdiction where a corporate defendant has its corporate headquarters . . . .”). 
 290. Interview with Eric Tostrud, Of Counsel, Lockridge Grindal Nauen 
P.L.L.P., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 6, 2015). 
 291. See Part II.B.2 (describing the economic benefits of the multidivisional 
form). 
 292. See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text. 
 293. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 12 (“The executives in the depart-
mental headquarters plan, administer, and coordinate the activities of one 
function on a . . . national scale rather than just locally.”). 
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6. The Corporate Functions Definition Is Consistent with  
Precedent 
Of course, courts should not adopt a different approach 
simply because the approach rests on sound theoretical 
grounds. Any change to the corporate general jurisdiction doc-
trine should be consistent with precedent. Nothing in Daimler 
suggests that the Supreme Court limited general jurisdiction 
over corporations to the forum where it is incorporated or has 
its principal place of business.294 In fact, the Court left the door 
open.295 To be sure, the place of incorporation and principal 
place of business are excellent paradigm fora. 
The Court, however, did not limit the proper general juris-
diction to these two fora.296 In “an exceptional case,” a corpora-
tion’s operations may be “so substantial and of such a nature as 
to render the corporation at home in that State.”297 Courts have 
interpreted this standard to require the functional equivalent 
of incorporation or principal place of business.298 Other courts 
have treated Daimler’s “exceptional case” as a search for a 
“surrogate for [a corporation’s] principal place of business.”299 
As the history of corporate structure shows, determining 
the “functional equivalent” of the corporation’s principal place 
of business will vary based on the organizational structure. The 
corporate functions approach is consistent with the search for a 
“functional equivalent.” It provides a nuanced approach by rec-
ognizing that corporations can, and often do, separate their 
functions.300 To put it differently, by looking for the offices from 
which a corporation directs its corporate strategy and manages 
its day-to-day operations test, a court is looking for the “func-
tions” of a traditional corporate headquarters. In this way, the 
 
 294. See Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-542-JL, 2015 
WL 3506517, at *5 (D.N.H. June 3, 2015). 
 295. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014) (“We do not 
foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case . . . a forum other than its 
formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may . . . render the 
corporation at home in that State.”). 
 296. Id. at 760 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to 
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its princi-
pal place of business . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
 297. Id. at 761 n.19. 
 298. See, e.g., Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 
2014); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL Docket No. 875, 2014 
WL 5394310, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014). For an example of an “exceptional 
case,” see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 299. Presby Patent Tr., 2015 WL 3506517, at *6. 
 300. See supra Part I.B.2 and accompanying text. 
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corporate functions test is consistent with the court’s precedent 
on “exceptional cases.” 
  CONCLUSION   
Today, corporations come in all shapes and sizes. As this 
Note demonstrates, corporations divide their “center of direc-
tion, control, and coordination”301 in a far more nuanced and 
variable manner than simply maintaining a centralized corpo-
rate headquarters. However, courts have given little thought to 
this prospect and, instead, have committed to a test that relies 
on the archaic assumption that every corporation structures it-
self in a centralized manner.302 Instead, in Daimler, the Su-
preme Court superimposed the restrictions of the diversity 
statute onto the corporate general jurisdiction doctrine by 
harkening to the Hertz test. In doing so, the Supreme Court 
unnecessarily infringed on state sovereignty—general jurisdic-
tion is unrestrained by congressional legislation, and bound on-
ly by the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, the Daimler test 
separates corporate general jurisdiction theory from the reali-
ties of corporate structure—creating a mismatch between theo-
ry and practice. 
Therefore, courts should expand the corporate general ju-
risdiction doctrine, ever so slightly, by recognizing that a corpo-
ration’s exercise of corporate functions (i.e., direction of corpo-
rate activities and management of day-to-day operations) 
subjects a corporation to general jurisdiction. By doing so, the 
courts can remove the artificial limitation on the exercise of 
state sovereignty and create a predictable and fair test for gen-
eral jurisdiction. Changing the general jurisdiction test to 
adapt to how corporations organize their structures will not 
open the floodgates. Instead, courts will be able to handle tough 
jurisdictional cases with greater flexibility. When a corporation 
divides its strategic decision-making from its management of 
day-to-day operations, the general jurisdiction test should ac-
count for this structure. Thus, the corporate functions test is a 
step in the right direction. 
 
 
 301. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010). 
 302. See id. 
